Dear Members of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination,

Following the recent discussion during the Committee’s 117th session concerning Uzbekistan’s report for 2020-2022, we, on behalf of the non-governmental organizations Via Serica Foundation (United States) and the Turkmen Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights (Bulgaria), respectfully submit additional information on issues raised during the discussion, as well as matters that are important for understanding the situation in Karakalpakstan.

1. During the session, the issue of the ban on the unregistered party “Alga Karakalpakstan,” which advocates for the rights of the Sovereign Republic of Karakalpakstan, was raised. The response of the Uzbek delegation was limited to a brief explanation that the party had been banned as “extremist” .

In this context, we consider it important to draw attention to the following. The decision of the Supreme Court of Uzbekistan to ban the organization “Alga Karakalpakstan” was adopted on 22 February 2024. The hearings were held behind closed doors, and representatives of the organization itself did not participate. The text of the decision has still not been published, nor has there been any official announcement in the media. For several months, the authorities of Uzbekistan concealed the very fact that the organization “Alga Karakalpakstan” had been banned. Only in June 2024, a researcher noticed a reference to this decision in a judgment in a criminal case in Karakalpakstan. The relevant information was published on the website of the Turkmen Helsinki Foundation (hereinafter, THF) and on social media, after which it was disseminated by foreign media outlets.

At present, the text of the decision remains unavailable; no official information about the ban has been published, and the reasoning behind the ban is unknown. At the same time, references to the decision appear in several judgments in criminal cases in Karakalpakstan under Article 244.2 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Uzbekistan. In the first of these cases, the accused (an ethnic Karakalpak, Parakhat Musapbarov, convicted on 30 May 2024 by the Khojeyli District Court of the Republic of Karakalpakstan) was charged with acts that allegedly took place prior to the adoption of the decision imposing the ban, which constitutes a violation of the rule of law.

In order to clarify the situation, the Committee may wish to request from the delegation of Uzbekistan the text of the decision banning “Alga Karakalpakstan,” as well as the Government’s comments on the Musapbarov case.

2. As noted during the session, the definition of “extremism” in the legislation of Uzbekistan is excessively broad and vague, allowing for the criminalization of non-violent expression of opinion.

The current model of anti-extremism legislation in Uzbekistan, as well as the corresponding law-enforcement practice, has been borrowed from Russia, where it demonstrates the same problems, a fact recognized at the international level. Within this model, the guilt of the accused is established primarily through controversial humanities-based expert assessments, while criticism of such assessments and alternative evaluations are ignored by the courts.

In Karakalpakstan, criminal charges under anti-extremism provisions of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Uzbekistan are most often brought against ethnic Karakalpaks who have posted videos or left comments on social media. Materials treated as “criminal” include, for example, videos of speeches by Karakalpak activists at OSCE Human Dimension meetings, recordings of the 2022 protest events, statements in support of the convicted leader of the Karakalpak protests, Dauletmurat Tajimuratov, or criticism of his trial, among others.

The THF database currently contains information on more than 130 criminal cases in Karakalpakstan under anti-extremism provisions of the Criminal Code, with judgments issued since late 2022 (excluding cases related to the events of July 2022). These cases include both religious and political charges (including “separatism”), with the proportion of the latter increasing each year.

These criminal cases receive virtually no coverage in the media of Uzbekistan or Karakalpakstan.

3. The term “separatism” is mentioned in three articles of the Criminal Code of Uzbekistan in the context of defining a criminal offence (Articles 244.1, 244.2, and 246). It is used almost exclusively in criminal cases in Karakalpakstan. However, there is no clear definition of this term.

On the one hand, as noted during the Committee’s session, the Constitution of Uzbekistan and the Constitution of Karakalpakstan provide for the right of the Republic of Karakalpakstan to secede “on the basis of a general referendum of the people of Karakalpakstan.”

On the other hand, any discussion of such matters in Karakalpakstan or the publication of materials on this topic on social media is treated as criminally punishable “separatism.”

This contradiction in the legislation has not yet been resolved, and dozens of Karakalpaks who expressed their views within the framework of the above constitutional provision have been convicted by courts for “separatism.”

4. During the Committee’s session, a representative of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Uzbekistan presented data on the number of criminal cases concerning incitement of hatred (Article 156 of the Criminal Code) referred to the courts of Uzbekistan in 2023–2025. The figures cited—ranging from 4 to 6 cases annually—are unreliable and significantly understated.

For comparison, figures based on the number of judgments published on the website of the Supreme Court of Uzbekistan indicate more than 60 cases in 2025, along with a rapid annual increase in the overall number of court cases beginning in 2024.

It is also worth noting that, despite numerous cases of offensive anti-Karakalpak posts and statements on social media, especially after 2022, only one known case exists in which the author of such statements was held accountable. A resident of the Beruniy District of Karakalpakstan, after hearing a response in the Karakalpak language on the Ministry of Internal Affairs hotline, began insulting Karakalpaks during the conversation with the operator and was held accountable in 2026.

5. In 2023, courts issued judgments in absentia against seven Karakalpaks charged under political articles of the Criminal Code who were outside the country at the time. All of them were sentenced to various terms of imprisonment.

These judgments were issued in gross violation of the right to a fair trial and of specific provisions of Uzbekistan’s criminal procedure law. Although the whereabouts of all seven individuals were known to the authorities of Uzbekistan, none of them was notified of the initiation of the criminal case or the beginning of the trial, as required by the Criminal Procedure Code, and no attempt was made to question any of them through available interstate procedures. Each of them was represented in court by a state-appointed lawyer; however, these lawyers did not even attempt to contact the defendants or their relatives.

Before the publication by the THF, five of them were not even aware that judgments had been issued against them.

Petitions to the Ombudsman in one of these cases remained unanswered; subsequently, the Ombudsman of Uzbekistan denied having received any submissions concerning these cases.

To the best of our knowledge, unlawful trials in absentia of this kind have, in recent years, taken place only in relation to ethnic Karakalpaks.

6. A recent study organized by the Turkmen Helsinki Foundation (THF) identified a discriminatory practice in the application of Article 202.1 of the Code of Administrative Responsibility of the Republic of Uzbekistan. This article provides for punishment for “inducement to participate in the activities of illegal non-governmental non-commercial organizations, movements, or sects.”

The brief preliminary findings of the study are as follows. According to materials published on the website of the Supreme Court of Uzbekistan, during the first three months of 2026, 142 persons were held liable under this article. Of these, 139 resided in Karakalpakstan. By ethnic composition, 98 were Karakalpaks, 9 were Kazakhs, and 8 were Uzbeks; for 27 individuals, information on ethnic affiliation was removed in the published court decisions. The proportion of Karakalpaks and the number of cases in the Republic of Karakalpakstan are clearly disproportionate.

At the same time, a selective review of 25 court decisions from March 2026 showed that, in the overwhelming majority of cases, there were no “illegal organizations” involved. In describing the elements of the “offences,” courts used wording such as “used his Instagram profile to support and encourage opinions and critical comments causing disagreement among citizens,” “capable of leading to unauthorized rallies,” and similar formulations.

Approximately the same territorial and ethnic disproportions are reflected in the statistics for 2025, when around 400 similar court decisions were issued.

Thus, this article of the Code of Administrative Responsibility is being deliberately used to suppress the freedom of expression of ethnic Karakalpaks.

7. Following the events of July 2022, the practice of politically motivated criminal prosecutions has become widespread in Karakalpakstan.

In December 2024, the latest version of the list of political prisoners of Karakalpakstan was published, containing 49 names (English version). The list was prepared by the International Working Group of Human Rights Defenders on Karakalpakstan.

A further update of the list is planned to be published this year.

8. During the session, questions were raised about the case of the leader of the 2022 Karakalpak protests, Dauletmurat Tajimuratov, who is serving a 16-year prison sentence. The official delegation of Uzbekistan assured Committee members that his rights were not being violated.

This information does not correspond to reality. Since his arrest in 2022, he has repeatedly faced various forms of pressure, ill-treatment, and unlawful restrictions of his rights. The situation has varied at different periods. However, for almost the entire period since his arrest, the authorities have restricted his correspondence and contacts with relatives, and in many cases his letters to official bodies were not delivered. This problem persists to this day.

In early 2026, a new criminal case was opened against Tajimuratov under Article 220, Part 2, of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Uzbekistan, which provides for a penalty of 5 to 10 years’ imprisonment for “disruption of the functioning of a correctional institution.” Tajimuratov’s relatives were not allowed to attend the proceedings, which began in late March; information about the proceedings was concealed from them; and visits were denied. Tajimuratov was represented only by a state-appointed lawyer. According to some sources, the pronouncement of the judgment was postponed due to the Committee’s consideration of Uzbekistan’s report. The next court hearing, at which the judgment may be announced, is scheduled for 1 May.

The delegation of Uzbekistan undoubtedly had information about the new charge and the ongoing trial, but did not disclose this information during the session.

9. The issue of the victims of the July 2022 events in Karakalpakstan remains unresolved. Since July 2022, Uzbekistan has published various figures regarding those killed and injured during the events. The most recent version of these figures was presented in a brief report by the Ombudsman in December 2024. Lists of names have not been published, but the names of those killed and injured are contained in judgments in cases concerning “mass disturbances.” These judgments have also not been officially published; however, Karakalpak activists obtained copies of all four judgments (including two in absentia) related to this case from relatives of convicted persons and other sources.

Lists and an analysis of the available information were published on the THF website in 2023.

In October 2025, human rights expert Vitaly Ponomarev, after studying the available data, noted in his speech at the Warsaw Human Dimension Conference, in particular, that: (1) there are discrepancies between the official figures on the number of victims presented by the Ombudsman and those contained in the materials of criminal cases; (2) the authorities are concealing information about the causes of death and the nature of injuries sustained by participants in the unrest; (3) there is still no clarity regarding the circumstances of the deaths of two friends of the protest leader Dauletmurat Tajimuratov—Madiyar Orazbayev and Ruslan Ibragimov—after their detention during the days of the events; (4) the criminal case files contain no evidence that any law enforcement officer died as a result of violence by participants in the unrest in Karakalpakstan, contrary to public statements by the Ombudsman and other officials; and (5) the available official materials avoid addressing the question of who made the decision to use lethal weapons against demonstrators and under what circumstances.

10. To date, there is no information on the number of residents of Karakalpakstan who disappeared without trace in July 2022. This figure would be extremely important in the context of verifying reports of extrajudicial executions and unofficial burials.

The Office of the Ombudsman of the Republic of Uzbekistan also ignored the THF’s request regarding the causes of the death of Karakalpakstan resident Kurbanbek Tileumuratov, who, according to unconfirmed information, became a victim of an extrajudicial execution.

11. In addition to the criminal cases concerning “mass disturbances” in July 2022 in Karakalpakstan, not all of which reached court (out of 168 accused persons, 107 were released without trial), 8,774 individuals, according to the Ombudsman’s report, were subjected to administrative penalties. The majority of them were ethnic Karakalpaks. Of these, 2,639 were subjected to administrative detention for 15 days, during which, according to unofficial information, they were tortured and denied access to a lawyer.

Eyewitnesses report that torture of detainees at that time was widespread, although this is officially denied.

There are testimonies that the current head of the Republic of Karakalpakstan, Amanbay Orynbaev, who at that time headed the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Karakalpakstan, was personally present during torture in a law-enforcement building in Nukus.

Many of those arrested in July 2022 in connection with the criminal case on “unrest” were held incommunicado until September 2022.

12. Against the background of international pressure regarding accountability for those responsible for the deaths of protesters, the authorities of Uzbekistan reported that three law-enforcement officers had been brought to criminal responsibility and convicted. This information was repeated in the Ombudsman’s report and during the Committee’s session.

However, not only have the names of these officers not been disclosed, it also remains unclear what specific acts—beyond the cited articles of the Criminal Code—they committed, and where and when those acts took place. The descriptions of the alleged criminal acts differ between the media statement and the Ombudsman’s report, and the official court website contains no information about hearings in this case. Diplomats in Tashkent have reported that they did not receive additional information through diplomatic channels.

In order to assess the situation, it would be important for the Committee to request more detailed information from the authorities of Uzbekistan regarding this case and, possibly, a copy of the judgment.

13. Kazakh human rights defender Galym Ageleuov, who was involved in investigating the events of 2022 in Karakalpakstan, including the issue of extrajudicial executions, was banned from entering Uzbekistan.

On 22 May 2023, Uzbekistan Airways refused to allow him to board a Bishkek–Tashkent flight, citing information from the Border Service of the Republic of Uzbekistan regarding an entry ban. The reasons for the ban remain unknown, as does its duration. The Ombudsman of Uzbekistan ignored requests related to this case.

There are reports that foreign human rights missions in Nukus in 2023 were subjected to overt surveillance.

14. It should be noted that, for several years, the Ombudsman of the Republic of Uzbekistan has repeatedly stated—on the margins of the OSCE Human Dimension Conference in Warsaw—that submissions from foreign human rights defenders on issues related to Karakalpakstan had allegedly not been received by her Office, and that, for this reason, no responses were provided. The Ombudsman refused to discuss the situation in Karakalpakstan during an in-person meeting.

The only response from the Office of the Ombudsman to a joint inquiry by the THF and the Memorial Centre, received in May 2025 (following our additional appeal to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Uzbekistan), unfortunately contained unreliable and inaccurate information. A new submission by the THF dated 4 July 2025, requesting clarification of the information and sent through at least two channels, remains unanswered (a copy of the submission in Russian is attached).

15. The Constitutions of Uzbekistan and Karakalpakstan include provisions stating that relations between the two republics are to be regulated by mutual treaties and agreements. However, there has been no official information about any treaty concluded since the adoption of the Constitution of Karakalpakstan in 1993.

In addition, both constitutions state that the Republic of Karakalpakstan may secede from Uzbekistan “on the basis of a general referendum of the people of Karakalpakstan.” However, a law on a referendum in Karakalpakstan has still not been adopted, while the corresponding law in Uzbekistan does not regulate the holding of a referendum in part of the territory forming part of Uzbekistan.

16. Serious problems are caused by the migration of the Uzbek population into Karakalpakstan from other regions of Uzbekistan, organized by Tashkent. The local population and local authorities are unable to influence this process, which is carried out within the framework of Tashkent’s policy and, according to activists, is aimed at altering the ethnic balance in the region. This leads to increased interethnic tensions.

It is no coincidence that, in July 2022, among the sites attacked by protesters were two headquarters of Uzbek settlers established with the involvement of territorial administrations on the territory of Karakalpakstan.

There are known cases in which local Karakalpaks were forced to work for low wages for Uzbek farmers who had arrived from other regions of Uzbekistan and were receiving state support.

Within the framework of Tashkent’s announced plans to develop the extractive industry in the region, jobs are being created with wages significantly higher than the average in Karakalpakstan. However, Karakalpaks are often denied employment under various pretexts (according to activists, such cases have occurred at major enterprises including “Uz-Kor Gas Chemical,” “Triangul Metals,” and others). In reality, this constitutes a discriminatory practice.

Data on migration in Karakalpakstan, including its ethnic dimension, are not published.

Respectfully,

Guly Nur, Via Serica Foundation

Annadurdy Khadzhiev, Turkmen Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights